Mixed Claims Commission - United States and Germany by unknown
International Law Studies—Volume 23 
International Law Decisions and Notes 
U.S. Naval War College (Editor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. 
MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION-UNITED STATES 
AND GERMANY 
OPINION IN THE "LUSITANIA" CASES 
November 1, 1923 
(Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, p. 17) 
PARKER, Umpire, delivered the opinion of the commis-
sion, the American and German commissioners concur-
ring in the conclusions: 
These cases grow out of the sinking of the British 
ocean liner Lusitania, which was torpedoed by a German statement of 
submarine off the coast of Ireland May 7, 1915, duringcase. 
the period of American neutrality. Of the 197 American 
citizens aboard the Lusitania at that time, 69 were saved 
.and 128 lost. The circumstances of the sinking are 
known to all the 'vorld, and as liability for losses sus-
tained by American nationals was assumed by the Gov-
-ernment of Germany through its note of February 4, 
1916, it 'vould serve no useful purpose to rehearse them 
here. 
Applying the rules laid down in Administrative Deci-
sions Nos. I and II handed down this date, 1 the commis- Rules of 
sion finds that Germany is financially obligated to pay mission. 
to the United States all losses suffered by American na-
tionals, stated in terms of dollars, where the claims 
therefor have continued in American ownership, which 
losses have resulted from death or from personal injury 
or from loss of, or damage to, property sustained in the 
sinking of the 'Lusitania. 
This finding disposes of this group of claims, save that 
there remain to be considered (1) issues involving the 
nationality of each claimant affecting the commission's 
jurisdiction, and (2) the measure of damages to be applied 
to the facts of each case. 
1 Reference is made to Administrative Decision No. I for the definition of the terms 
used herein. 
'Ve are here dealing with a group of cases all growing out of a single catastrophe. As 
it is manifestly of paramount importance that the same rules of decision shall govern 
the disposition of each and all of them, whether disposed of by agreement between the two 
commissioners or in the event of their disagreement by the umpire, this opinion an-
nouncing such rules is, at the request of the two commissioners, prepared by the umpire, 
both commissioners concurring in the conclusions. The principles and rules here laid 
down will, where applicable, govern the American and German agents and their respec-
tive counsel in the preparation and presentation of all claims. 
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Damages. 
In this decision rules applicable to the measure of 
damages in death cases will be considered. In formu-
lating such rules and determining the \Veight to be given 
to the decisions of courts and tribunals dealing v;ith this 
subject, it is important to bear in mind the basis of re-
covery in death cases in the jurisdictions announcing 
such decisions. 
At common law there existed no cause of action for 
damages caused by the death of a human being. The 
right to maintain such actions has, however, been long 
conferred by statutes enacted by Great Britain and by 
all of the American States. The German code expressly 
recognizes liability for the taking of life.2 These legis-
lative enactments vary in their terms to such an extent 
that there can not be evolved from the1n and the de-
cisions of the courts construing them any co1nposite 
uniform rules governing this branch of the la\v. Such 
statutes and decisions as well as the other governing 
principles set out in this commission's Administrative 
Decision No. II will, however, be considered in determin-
ing the applicable rules governing the measuring of 
damages in death cases. 
The statutes enacted in comrnon-law jurisdictions con-
ferring a cause of action in death cases \vhere none before 
existed have frequently limited by restrictive terms the 
rules for measuring damages in such cases. The tendency, 
however, of both statutes and decisions is to give such 
elasticity to these restrictive rules as to enable courts 
and juries in applying them to the facts of each particu--: 
lar case to award full and fair compensation for the in-
jury suffered and the loss sustained.3 The statutes of 
several States of the American Union authorize juries to 
award such damages as are "fair and just" or "pro-
portionate to the injury." Under such statutes the 
decisions of the courts give to the juries 1nuch broader 
latitude in assessing damages than those of other States 
2 Section 823. See also Huebner's "History of Germanic Private Law," 1918, pp. 
578-579, and Schuster's "Principles of German Civil Law," 1907, sees. 284-286. 
a Nohrden v. Northeastern Railroad Go., 1900, 59 South Carolina Reports 87, 105-108, 
37 Southeastern Reporter 228, 238-240; Stuckey v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Go., 1901, 
60 South Carolina Reports 237, 252-253; Parker v. Crowell & Spencer Lu77.Lber Go., 1905, 
115 Louisiana Reports 463, 468, 39 Southern Reporter 445, 446; Bourg v. Brownell-Drews 
Lumber Go., 1908, 120 Louisiana Reports 1009, 1022-1027, 45 Southern Reporter 972, 
977-979; Seaboard Airline Railway v. Moseley, 1910, 60 Fl.orida Heports 186, 189; Peters 
v. Southa-n Pacific Go., 1911, 160 California Reports 48, 69-71; Underu·ood v. Gulf Re-
fining Go., 1911, 128 Louisiana Reports 968, 937-1003, 55 Southern Reporter 641, 646-
653; Johnson v. Industrial Lumber Go., 1912, 131 Louisiana Reports 897, 910, 60 Southern 
Reporter 608, 612. 
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'vhere the statutes expressly limit them to so-called 
"pecuniary injuries," 4 which is a term much misunder-
stood. 
In most of the jurisdictions where the civil law is ad-
ministered and where the right of action for injuries 
resulting in death has long existed independent of any 
code or statute containing restrictions on rules for 
measuring damages, the courts have not been ham-
pered in so formulating such rules and adapting them to 
the facts of each case as to give complete compensation 
for the loss sustained. 
It is a general rule of both the civil and common la'v 
that every invasion of private right imports an injury 
and that for every such injury the law gives a remedy. 
Speaking generally, that remedy must be commensurate 
with the injury received. It is variously expressed as 
"compen3ation," "reparation," "indemnity," "recom-
pense,'' and is measured by pecuniary standards, because, 
says Grotius, 5 "money is the common measure of valu-
able things." 
In death cases the right of action is for the loss sustained 
by the claimants, not by the estate. The basis of damages 
is, not the physical or mental suffering of deceased or his 
loss or the loss to his estate, but the losses resulting to 
claimants from his death. The inquiry then is: What 
amount 'viii compensate claimants for such losses~ 
Bearing in mind that we are not concerned with any 
problems involving the punishment of a 'vrongdoer but 
only with the naked question of fixing the amount 'vhich 
4 ~Iynning v. The Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad Co., 1886, 59 1\,Iichigan Reports 
257, 261-262, 26 Northwestern Reporter 514, 516-517; Simmons v. ~Ic Connell, 1890, 86 
Virginia Reports 494, 496-497, 10 Southeastern Reporter 838, 839; Tlte Ohio and Jfissis-
sippi Railu.,.ay Co. v. Wangelin, 1894, 152 Illinois Reports 138, 142, 38 Northeastern Re-
porter 760, 761; Turner v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 1895, 40 West Virginia Reports 675, 
638-689, 693-695, 22 Southeastern Reporter 83, 87, 9; Strother v. South Carolina & Georgia 
Railroad Co., 1896, 47 South Carolina Reports 375, 383-384, 25 Southeastern Reporter 
272, 274; 1lfason v. Southern Railu·ay Co., 1900, 58 South Carolina Reports 70, 77, 36 
Southeastern Reporter 440, 442; Parl;er v. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co., 1905, 115 
Louisiana Reports 463, 468, 39 Southern Reporter 445, 446; Norfolk & Western Railu·ay 
Co. v. Cheatwood's Administratrix, 1905, 103 Virginia Reports 356, 364-365, 49 Southeast-
ern Reporter 48!, 491-192; Butte Electric Ry. Co. v. Jor.es, 1908, C. C. A., 164 Federal • 
Reporter 308, 311, 18 Lawyers' Heports Annotated (New Series) 1205, 1208; Brennen 
v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 1909, 147 Illinois Appellate Court Reports 263, 270-
273; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ilau·kins ("West Virginia), 1909, C. C. A., 174 Federal 
Reporter 597, 601-602, 98 Circuit Court of Appeals 443, 447-448. 
s "The Rights of War and Peace," by llugo Grotius, Whewell translation, 1853 (here-
nafter cited as "Grotius"), Book II, Ch. XVII, Sec. XXII; Sedgwick on Damages, 
9th (1912) edition (hereinafter cited as "Sedgwick"), Sec. 30. 
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vrill compensate for the wrong done, our formula expressed 
esti- in general terms for reaching that end is: Estimate the 
amounts (a) which the decedent, had he not been killed, 
would probably have contributed to the claimant, add 
thereto (b) the pecuniary value to such claimant of the 
deceased's personal services in claimant's care, education, 
or supervision, and also add (c) reasonable compensation 
for such 1nental suffering or shock, if any, caused by the 
violent severing of family ties, as claimant may actually 
have sustained by reason of such death. The sum of 
these estimates, reduced to its present cash value, \Vill 
generally represent the loss sustained by claimant. 
In making such estimates there \vill be considered, 
among other factors, the follo,ving: 
(a) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life, 
occupation, habits of industry and sobriety, mental and 
physical capacity, frugality, earning capacity and custom-
ary earnings of the deceased and the uses made of such 
earnings by him: 
(b) The probable duration of the life of deceased but 
for the fatal injury, in arriving at vrhich standard life-
expectancy tables and all other pertinent evidence 
offered will be considered; 
(c) The reasonable probability that the earning capa-
city of deceased, had he lived, would either have increased 
or decreased; 
(d) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life, 
and probable life expectancy of each of the claimants; 
(e) The extent to which the deceased, had he lived, 
would have applied his income from his earnings or· 
other\vise to his personal expenditures from \Vhicb 
claimants would have derived no benefits; 
(f) In reducing to their present cash value contributions 
which would probably have been made from time to time 
to claimants by deceased, a 5 per cent interest rate and 
standard present-value tables \Vill be used; 
(g) Neither the physical pain nor the mental anguish 
\Vhich the deceased may have suffered will be considered 
as elements of damage; 
(h) The amount of insurance on the life of the deceased 
0ollected by his estate or by the clain1ants \vill not. be 
taken into account in computing the damages which 
~laimants may be entitled to recover; 
(i) No exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages 
can be assessed. 
BAS.ES OF DAMAGES 
The foregoing statement of the rules for measuring 
damages in death cases \Vill be applied by the American 
agent and the German agent and their respective 
counsel in the preparation and submission of all such 
cases. The enumeration of factors to be taken into 
account in assessing damages \vill not be considered as 
exclusive of all others. When either party conceives 
that other faetors should be considered, having a tendency 
either to increase or decrease the quantum of damages, 
such factors will be called to the attention of the com-
mission in the presentation of the particular case. 
l\1ost of the elements entering into the rules here 
expressed for measuring damages, and the factors to 
be taken into account in applying them, are so obv-iously 
sound and firmly established by both the civil and coin-
mon law authorities as to make further elaboration 
wholly unnecessary. As counsel for Germany, however, 
very earnestly contends that the mental suffering of a 
claimant does not constitute a recoverable element of 
damage in death cases, and also contends that life 
insurance paid claimants on the happening of the death 
of deceased should be deducted in estimating the claim-
ant's loss, we will state the reasons why we are unable 
to adopt either of these contentions. The American 
counsel, with equal earnestness, contends that exemplary, 
punitive, and vindictive damages should be assessed 
against Germany for the use and benefit of each private 
claimant. For the reasons hereinafter set forth at 
length this contention is rejected. 
Mental suffering.-The legal concept of damages is 
judicially ascertained compensation for wrong. The 
compensation must be adequate and balance as near 
as may be the injury suffered. In many tort cases, 
including those for personal injury and for death, it is 
manifestly impossible to compute rnathematically or 
with any degree of accuracy or by the use of any precise 
formula the damages sustained, involving such inquiries 
as how long the deceased would probably have lived 
but for the fatal injury; the amount he would have 
177 
earned, and of such earnings the amount he \vould M t 1 ff en a su er· 
have contributed to each member of his family; the ing. 
pecuniary value of his supervision over the education 
and training of his children; the amount \Vhich \viii 
reasonably compensate an injured man for suffering 
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excruciating and prolonged physical pain; and many 
other inquiries concerning elements universally recog-
nized as constituting recoverable damages. This, ho"\v-
ever, furnishes no reason 'vhy the "\Vrongdoer should 
escape repairing his wrong or "\vhy he "\vho suffered 
should not receive reparation therefor measured by 
rules as nearly approximating accuracy as human 
ingenuity can devise. To deny such reparation would 
be to deny the fundamental principle that there exists 
remedy for the direct invasion of every right. 
Mental suffering is a fact just as real as physical 
suffering, and susceptible of measurement by the same 
standards. The interdependency of the mind and the 
body, now universally recognized, may result in a mental 
shock producing physical disorders. But quite apart 
from any such result, there can be no doubt of the reality 
of mental suffering; of sickness of mind as well as sickness 
of body, and of its detrimental and injurious effect on the 
individual and on his capacity to produce. Why, then, 
should he be remediless for this injury? The courts of 
France under the provisions of the Code Napoleon have 
always held that mental suffering or "prejudice morale" 
is a proper element to be considered in actions brought 
for injuries resulting in death. A like rule obtains in 
several American States, including Louisiana, South 
Carolina, and Florida.6 The difficulty of measuring 
mental suffering or loss of mental capacity is conceded, 
but the law does not refuse to take notice of such injury 
on account of the difficulty of ascertaining its degree. 
On careful analysis it will be found that decisions 
announcing a contrary rule by some of the American 
courts are measurably influenced by the restrictions 
imposed by the language of the statutes creating the 
right of action for injuries resulting in death. As herein-
after pointed out, these very restrictions have in some 
instances driven the courts to permit the juries to award 
as exemplary damages what were in truth compensatory 
da1nages for mental suffering, rather than leave the 
plaintiff without a remedy for a real injury sustained. 
G Nohrden v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 1900, 59 South Carolina Reports 87, 105-108, 
37 Southeastern Reporter 228, 238-240; Stuckey v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 1901, 
60 South Carolina Reports 237, 253; Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 1908, 120 
Louisiana Reports 1009, 1022-1026, 45 Southern Reporter 972, 977-978; Seaboard Air Line 
Railway v. }rfoseley, 1910, 60 Florida Reports 186, 18!>-190; Underwood v. Gulf Refining 
Co., 1911, 128 Louisiana Reports 869, 986, U90-1003; Johnson v. Industrial Lumber Co. 
1912, 131 Louisiana Heports 897, 908-909. 
INSURANCE 
Mental suffering to form a basis of recovery must be 
real and actual, rather than purely sentimental and 
vague. 7 
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Insurance.-Counsel for Germany insist that in arriving 1 t nsumnce no 
at clain1ants' net loss there should be deducted from the to benefit wro ng 
present value of the contributions which the deceased 
would probably have made to claimants had he lived all 
payments made to claimants under policies of insurance 
on the life of deceased. The contention is opposed to 
all American decisions and the more recent decisions of 
the English courts. The various reasons given for these 
decisions are, however, for the most part inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory. But it is believed that the contention 
here made by the counsel for Germany is based upon a 
misconception of the essential nature of life insurance 
and the relations of the beneficiaries thereto. 
Unlike marine and fire insurance, a life insurance con-
tract is not one of indemnity, but a contract absolute in 
its terms for the payment of an amount certain on the 
happening of an event certain-death-at a time un-
certain. The consideration for the claiinants' contract-
rights is the premium paid. These premiums are based 
upon the risk taken and are proportioned to the amount 
of the policy. The contract is in the nature of an in-
vestment made either by, or in behalf of, the beneficiaries. 
'fhe claimants' rights under the insurance contracts 
existed prior11to the commission of the act complained of, 
and prior to the death of deceased. Under the terms of 
the contract these rights were to be exercised by claimants 
upon the happening of a certain event. The mere fact 
that the act complained of hastened that event can not 
inure to Germany's benefit, as there was no uncertainty 
as to the happening of the event, but only as to the time 
of its happening. Sooner or later payn1ent must be made 
under the insurance contract. Such payment of insur-
ance, far fro1n springing from Germany's act, is entirely 
foreign to it. If it be said that the acceleration of death 
secures to the claimants now \Vhat might other\\rise have 
been paid to others had deceased survived claimantcs, and 
that therefore claimants may possibly have benefited 
through Germany's act, the ans\ver is that the law will 
not for the benefit of the "\Vrongdoer enter the do1nai-o of 
speeulation and consider the probability or probabilities 
7 Sedgwick, sec. 46a. 
doer. 
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in order to offset an absolute and certain contract right 
against the uncertain damages flo\ving from a wrong. 
Dse of life-expectancy and present-value tables.-Or-
dinarily the facts to which must be applied the rules of 
law in measuring damages in death cases lie largely in 
the future. It results that, absolute kno,vledge being 
impossible, the law of probabilities and of averages must 
be resorted to in estimating damages, and these preclude 
Useofinsurance the possibility of makinO' any precise computations or tables. o ~ 
mathen1atical calculations. Ad an aid-but solely as an 
aid-in estimating damages in this clas3 of cases, the 
con1mission will consider the standard life-expectancy 
and present-value tables. These will be used not as 
absolute guides but in connection \vith other evidence,· 
such as the condition of the health of deceased, the risks 
incident to his vocation, and any other circumstances 
tending to throw light on the probable length of his life 
but for the act of Germany complained of. To the 
extent that happenings subsequent to the death of de-
ceased make certain what was before uncertain, to such 
extent the rules of probabilities will be discarded. 
Neither will we lose sight of the fact that life tables are 
based on statistics of the length of life of individuals, not 
upon the duration of their physical or mental capacity 
or of their earning powers. In using such tables it will 
be borne in mind that the present value of the probable 
earnings of deceased depends on many more unknowable 
contingencies than does the present value of a life annuity 
or dower. Included among these contingencies are 
possible and probable periods of illness, periods of unem-
ployment even when well, and various degrees of dis-
ability arising from gradually increasing age. The weight 
to be given to such tables \vill, therefore, be determined 
by the commis3ion in the light of ~he facts developed 
in each particular case. 
Exemplary damages.-American counsel with great 
earnestness insists ·that exemplary, or, as they are fre-
quently designated, punitive and vindictive, da1nages 
~hould be assessed by this commission against Gern1any 
in behalf of private claimants. Because of the impor-
tance of the question presented the nature of exemplary 
damages will he examined and the commission's reasons 
for declining to assess such damages \vill be fully stated. 
Undoubtedly the rule permitting the recovery of ex-
emplary damages as such is firmly intrenched in the 
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jurisprudence of most of the States of the Americanda~~g~~piarY 
Union: although it has been repudiated by the courts of 
s3veral of them and its soundness on principle is chal-
lenged by some of the leading American text writers.8 
The re.ason for the rule authorizing the imposition of 
exemplary in addition to full reparation or compensa-
tory da1nages is that they are justified ''by way of pun-
ishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from 
offending in like manner." 9 The source of the rule is 
frequently traced to a remark alleged to have been made 
by Lord Chief Justice Pratt (afterwands Lord Camden) 
in instructing a jury (italics ours) that :10 
"Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to 
the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the 
guilty, to deter fro1n any such proceeding for the future, 
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action 
~tse . . if" 
That such a charge was ever in fact given has been 
questioned. 11 1-Io\vever this 1nay be, this alleged in-
struction has been quoted and requoted by the courts of 
England and of America as authority for the awarding of 
exemplary damages where the tort complained of has 
been wilfully or wantonly or maliciously inflicted. 
In some of the earlier cases the awards of exemplary 
damages were sustained "for example's sake" and "to 
prevent such offense in the future," and again "to inflict 
damages for example's sake and by way of punishing the 
defendant." In one early New York case 12 it was said: 
"We concede that smart money allowed by a jury, and 
a fine imposed at the suit . of the people, depend on the 
sa1ne principle. Both are penal, and intended to deter 
others from the commission of the like crime." 
In our opinion the words exemplary, vindictive, or 
punitive as applied to damages are misnomers. ~The 
fundamental concept of "damages" is satisfaction, re-
paration for a loss suffered; a judicially ascertained com-
pensation for wrong. 13 The remedy should be com-
mensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may 
s Fay v. Parker, 1873, 53 New Hampshire Reports 342; Sedgwick, sec. 354; Greenleaf on 
Evidence, 1!ith (1892) edition, Vol. II, sees. 253, 254, 266, and 267. 
9 Lake Shore & J-lichigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, 1893, 147 United States 
Reports 101, 107. 
1o Wilkes v. lVood, 1763, 19 Howell's State Trials (1816) 1153, 1167, LotTt 's Reports 
(li90), pages 1 and 19 of first case. 
11 Sedgwick, sec. 350. 
12 Cook v. Ellis, 1844, 6 Hill's (New York) Reports 466, 467. 
13 Sedgwick, sec. 57la. 
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be made whole. 14 'l'he superimposing of a penalty in 
ttddition to full compensation and na1ning it damages, 
'vith the qualifying word exemplary, vindictive, or 
punitive, is a hopeless confusion of terms, inevitably 
leading to confusion of thought. Many of the American 
authorities lay down the rule that where no actual damage 
has been suffered no exemplary damages can be allowed, 
giving as a reason that the latter are awarded, not because 
the plaintiff has any right to recover them, but because 
the d~fendant deserves punishment for his wrongful acts; 
and that, as the plaintiff can not maintain an action 
merely to inflict punishment upon a supposed wrongdoer, 
if he has no cause of action independent of a supposed 
right to recover exemplary damages, he has no cause of 
action at all. 15 It is apparent that the theory of the 
rule is not based upon any right of the plaintiff to receive 
the a'vard assessed against the defendant, but that the 
defendant should be punished. The more el).lightened 
principles of government and of la'v clothe the state 'vith 
the sole power to punish but insure to the individual full, 
adequate, and complete compensation for a 'vrong in-
flicted to his detriment. 16 
An examination of the American authorities leads to 
the conclusion that the exemplary damage rule owes its 
origin and gro\vth, to some extent at least, to the diffi-
culties experienced by judges in tort cases of clearly 
defining in their instructions to juries the different 
fac.tors which may be taken into account and readily 
applied by them in assessing the quantum of damages 
which a plaintiff may recover. It is difficult to lay 
down any rule for measuring injury to the feelings, or 
humiliation or shame, or mental suffering, and yet it 
frequently happens ·that such injuries are very real and 
ca.Zl for compensation as act1~al damages as much as 
u Grotius, Book II Chap. XVII, Sec. X: Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, ehap. 
29, Sec. VII, par. 2 (*p. 438); Sedgwiek; see. 29. 
16 Schippel v. Norton, 1888, 38 Kansas Reports 567, 572; Meighan v. Birmingham Term-
inal Co., 1910, 165 Alabama Reports 591, 599. 
16 Vattel's Law of Nations, Chitty edition with notes by Ingraham ,1852 (1857), (here-
inafter cited as "Vattel") Book I, sec. 169, where it is said: "Now, when men unite i!l 
soeiety-as the society is thenceforward eharged with the duty of providing for the safety 
of its members, the individuals all resign to it their private right of punishing. To the 
whole body, therefore, it belongs to avenge private injuries, while it protects the citizcn3 
~t large. And as it is a moral person, capable also of being injured, it has a right to pro· 
vide for its own safety, by punishing those who trespass against it-that is to say, it has 
a right to punish publie delinquents. Hence arises the right of the sword, which belongs 
to a nation, or to its eonductor. Vlhen the soeicty use it against another nation, they 
make war; when they exert it in punishing an individual, they exercise vindictive 
justiee." 
COl\fPENSATORY DAMAGES 
physical pain and suffering and n1any other elements 
which, though difiicult to lneasure by pecuniary stand-
ards, are, nevertheless, universally considered in R\Varding 
compensatory damages. The trial judges,_ following the 
lead of Lord Camden,17 have found it easier to permit 
the juries to award plaintiffs in the 'vay of damages a 
penalty assessed against defendants guilty of willful, 
malicious, or outrageous conduct to,vard the plaintiffs, 
rather than undertake to formulate rules to enable the 
juries to measure in pecuniary terms the extent of the 
actual injuries.18 In cases cited and numerous others, 
the damages dealt with and designated by the court as 
"exemplary" 'vere in their nature purely compensatory 
and awarded as reparation for actual injury sustained. 
That one injured is, under the rules of international 
law, entitled to be compensated for an injury inflicted 
resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, 
humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position 
or injury to his credit or to his reputation, there can be 
no doubt, and such colnpensation should be commen-
surate to the injury. Such damages are very real, and 
the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or esti-
mate by money standards makes them none the less 
real and affords no reason why the injured person should 
not be compensated therefor as compensatory damages, 
but not as a penalty. The tendency of the decisions and 
statutes of the several American States seems to be to 
broaden the scope of the elements to be considered in 
assessing actual and compensatory damages, 'vith the 
corresponding result of narrowing the application of the 
exemplary damages rule.1g 
The industry of counsel has failed to point us to any 
money award by an international arbitral tribunal 'vhere 
17 Wilkes v. lVood, note 10 supra. 
18 Boydan v. Haberstumpf, 1901, 129 Michigan Reports 137, where it was held (p. 140; 
italics ours) that the term "exemplary damages," as employed in Michigan, "has 
generally been understood to mean an increased award of damages in view of the sup-
posed aooravation of the injury to the feelings by the wanton or reckless act of the 
• defendant," and that "It has never been the policy of the court to permit jurie~ to 
award captiously any sum which may appear just to them, by way of punishment to 
the offender, but rather to award a sum in addition to the actual proven damages, as 
:vhat, in their judgment, constitutes a ju.st mea,mre of compensation for injury to feel· 
1ngs, in view of the circumstances of each particular case.'' 
Peoram v. Stortz, 1888, 31 West Virginia Reports 220, 229, 242-24::1; Gzl!inoham v. Ohio 
River Railroad Co., 1891,35 West Virginia Reports 588, 599-GOO; Levy v. Flei.~chner, .Mayer 
& Co., 1895, 12 Wash!ngton Reports 15, 17-18. 
19 Sec the cases cited in note (i above. Jn the cnsc cited from 128 Loni!dana Reports 
the court said, at page ~92, "the idea that damages allowed for mental sufTering nre 
exemplary, punitory, or vindictive in their character has been very generally ahan-
d oned, and they arc now recognized hy thi3 court and otbcr courts as actual and 
compensatory.'' 
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Moke case. 
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages have been 
assessed against' one sovereign nation in favor of another 
presenting a claim in behalf of its nationals. 20 Great 
stress is laid by counsel on the Moses Moke case 21 
which arose under the convention between the United 
States and Mexico of July 4, 1868. !vloke, an American 
citizen, was subjected to a day's imprisonment to" force'' 
him to "loan" $1,000. l-Ie sought to recover the amount 
of the "loan" and damages. The American Commis-
sioner vVadsworth, speaking for the commission, said: 
''We wish to condemn the practice of forcing loans by 
the n1ilitary, and think an award of $500 for 24 hours' 
imprisonment will be sufficient * * * If larger sums 
in damages, in such cases, were needed to vindicate the 
right of individuals to be exempt from such abuses, \Ve 
'vould undoubtedly feel required to give them." 
This language is the nearest approach to a recognition 
of the doctrine of exemplary damages that we have found 
in any reported decision of a mixed arbitral tribunal, b.ut 
we do not regard the decision in this case as a recognition 
of this doctrine. On the contrary, an award of $500 for 
the humiliation and inconvenience suffered by this 
American citizen for the outrageous treatment accorded 
2o "International Arbitral Law and Procedure," by Jackson H. Ralston, 1910, sec. 369, 
where he says: 
"While there is little doubt that in many cases the idea of punishment bas influenced 
the amount of the award, yet we are not prepared to state that any commission has 
accepted the view that it possessed the power to grant anything save compensation. 
* * * " 
Borchard's "The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad," 1915 (1922), sec. 174, 
makes substantially the same statement in these words: "Arbitral commissions, while 
often apparently taking into consideration the seriousness of the offense and the idea 
of punishment in fixing the amount of an award, have generally regarded their powers 
as limited to the granting of compensatory, rather than exemplary, damages." 
Doctor Lieber, umpire of the commission under the convention of July 4, 1868, between 
tho United States and Mexico, in awarding the sum of $4,000 on an $85,000 claim, said 
(p. 4311, Vol. IV, of Moore's "History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to 
which the United States Has Been a Party," 1898, hereinafter cited as "l\ioore's Arbi-
trations"): "Nor can these high damages be explained as exemplary damages. Our 
commission has no punitive mission, nor is there any offense to be punished." 
See also opinion of Umpire Bertinatti in the case of Ogden, administrator of the estate 
of Isaac Harrington, in which an award of $1,000 \Vas made on an original demand of 
$160,000 where the claim was made that an American citizen was treated oppressively 
and with great indignity by Costa Rica. II lVIoore's Arbitrations, p. 1566. 
21 IV Moore's Arbitrations, 3411. 
Counsel also lays much stress on the language used by Um:pire Duffield of the German-
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission in the Metzger case (pp. 578-580, "Venezuelan 
Arbitrations of 1903," report by Jackson H. Ralston, 19(}1, hereinafter cited as "Vcne-
zuel:m Arbitrations 1903"), where it is said (p. 580: italics ours): "Neither can anything 
be allo\ved in the way of punith·c or exemplary damages against Venezuela, because it 
appears, as above stateu, that the general commanding the army promptly took action 
against the o1Tender and punished him by imprisonment." Clearly this is dictltm. 
The case was apparently correctly decided and there was no reason for giving any care-
ful consideration to the right of the commission to go further than award compensatory 
damages. 
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him by the Mexican authorities can hardly be said to be 
adequate compensation. Certainly the award has in it 
none of the elements of punishment, nor can it be evoked 
as an example to deter other nations from according 
similar treatment to American citizens. 
But it is not necessary for this commission to go to the 
length of holding that exemplary damages can not be 
awarded in any case by any international arbitral tri-
bunal. A sufficient reason \vhy such damages can not be 
a\varded by this commission is that it is without the t· Treaty obliga• Ions. 
power to make such awards under the terms of its char-
ter-the treaty of Berlin. It will be borne in mind that 
this is a "treaty between the United States and Germany 
restoring friendly relations "-a treaty of peace. Its 
terms negative the concept of the imposition of a penalty 
by the United States against Germany, save that the 
undertaking by Germany to make reparation to the 
United States and its nationals as stipulated in the treaty 
may partake of the nature of a penalty.22 
Part VII of the treaty of Versailles (arts. 227 to 230, 
inclusive) deals with "penalties." It is significant that 
these provisions were not incorporated in the treaty of 
Berlin. 
In negotiating the treaty of peace, the United States 
and Germany were of course dealing directly with each 
other. Had there been any intention on the part of the 
United States to exact a penalty either as a punishment 
or as an example and a deterrent, such intention would 
have been clearly expressed in the treaty itself; and, had 
it taken the form of a money payment, would have been 
claimed by the Government of the United States on its 
O\Vn behalf and not on behalf of its nationals. As to 
such nationals, care was taken to provide for full and 
adequate "indemnities," ''reparations," and "satisfac-
tion" of their claims for losses, damages, or injuries 
suffered by them. While under that portion of the treaty 
of Versailles which has by reference been incorporated in 
the treaty of Berlin, Germany "accepts" responsibility 
for all loss and damage to \vhich the United · States and 
its nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the 
'var, nevertheless the United States frankly recognizes 
22 Oppenheim on International Law, 3d (1920) edition (hereinafter cited as "Oppen-
heim"), Vol. II, sec. 259a, p. 353, where it is said (italics ours): "There is no doubt that 
if a belligerent can be made to pay compensation for all damage done by him in violating 
the laws of war, this will be an indirect means of securing legitimate warfare." 
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the fact ''that the resources of Germany are not ade-
quate * * * to make complete reparation for all 
such loss and damage", but requires that Germany make 
''compensation" for specified damages suffered by Ameri-
can nationals.23 For the enormous cost to the Govern-
ment of the United States in prosecuting the war no claim 
is made against Germany. No claims against Germany 
are being asserted by the Government of the United 
States on account of pensions paid, and compensation in 
the nature of pensions paid, to naval and military victims 
of the war and to their families and dependents.24 In 
view of this frank recognition by the Government of the 
United States of Germany's inability to make to it full 
and complete reparation for all of the consequences of the 
war, how can it be contended that there should be read 
into the treaty an obligation on the part of Germany to 
pay penalties to the Government of the United States for 
the use and benefit of a small group of American nationals 
for 'vhose full and complet~ compensation for losses sus-
tained adequate provision has been made? 
The United States is in effect making one demand 
against Germany on some 12,500 counts. That demand 
is for compensation and reparation for certain losses sus-
tained by the United States and its nationals. While in 
determining the amount which Germany is to pay, each 
claim must be considered separately, no one of them can 
be disposed of as an isolated claim or suit, but must be 
considered in relation to all others presented in this one 
demand. In all of the claims the parties are the same. 
They must all be determined and disposed of under the 
same treaty and by the same tribunal. If it were pos-
sible to read into the treaty a provision authorizing this 
commission to assess a penalty against Germany as a 
punishment or as an example or deterrent, what warrant 
is there for allocating such penalty or any part of it to 
any particular claim and how should it be distributed~ 
Why should one American national who has sustained a 
loss receive in addition to full compensation "smart 
money" rather than another? Should the full amount 
of the penalty be imposed in connection with a particular 
claim or in connection with a particular incident out of 
which a number of claims arose or in connection with all 
acts of a particular class? Why impose a penalty for the 
23 Arts. 231 and 232 and Annex I to Sec. I of Pt. VIII of the treaty of Versailles. 
21 See note 11 to this commission's Administrative Decision No. II banded down this 
day. 
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use and benefit of a small group of American nationals 
who are a\varded full con1pensation and at the same ti1ne 
·waive reimbursement for the cost of the \Var \Vhich falls 
on all American taxpayers alike~ 
If it \Vere competent for this commission to impose such 
a ·penalty, vvhat penalty stated in terms of dollars would 
suffice as a deterrent~ And if this commission should 
arrogate to itself the authority to impose in the form of 
Treaty con-
damages a penalty which would effectively serve as a struction. 
deterrent, where lie the boundaries of its powers~ It is 
not hampered \Vith any constitutional limitations save 
those found in the treaty; and if the power to impose a 
penalty exists under the treaty may not the commission 
exercise that power in a way to affect the future political 
relations of the tv1o Governments ~25 The mere statement 
of the question is its ans\ver. Putting the inquiry only 
serves to illustrate ho\v repugnant to the fundamental 
princjples of international lavv is the idea that this com-
mission should treat as justiciable the question as to what 
penalty should be assessed against Germany as a punish-
ment for its alleged \Vrongdoing. It is our opinion that 
as between sovereign nations the question of the right 
and po,ver to impose penalties unlimited in amount is 
political rather than legal in its nature, and therefore not 
a subject \vithin the jurisdiction of this commission. 
The treaty is our charter. "V\T e can not look beyond its 
express provisions or its clear implications in assessing 
damages in any particular claim. vVe hold that its clear 
and unam:piguous language does not authorize the impo-
sition of penalties. Hence the fundarnental maxim "It 
is not allow'"able to interpret that which has no need of 
interpretation" applies.26 But all of the rules governing 
the interpretation of treaties would lead to the same 
result were it competent for us to look to them. Some 
of these are: rrhe treaty is based upon the resolution of 
the Congress of the United States, accepted and adopted 
by Germany. The language, being that of the United 
States and framed for its benefit, vvill be strictly construed 
against it.27 Treaty provisions must be so construed as 
25 Yattel, Book II, Cllap. XVIII, Eec. 329. 
2G Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sec. 2G3. 
27 Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sec. 264: Digest of Justinian, Book II, Title XIV 
par. 39, Monro translation, 1904; "Treaties-Their Making and Enforcement" by Sam: 
uel B. Crandall, 2d (1916) edition (hereinafter cited as "Crandal "), sec. 171, p. 401~ 
Pothier on Obligations (Evans, 180G), Vol. I, p. 53 (seventh rule, Art. VII, Chap. I, Pt. 
I): '.Yoolsey on International Law, sixth (1891) edition, sec. 113; opinion of Ralston, urn· 
pire, Italian·Venezuelnn 1'li.xed Claims Commission, Sambiaggio <;ase, Venezuelan Ar-
bitrations 1903, pp. GG6 and ()88-689. 
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to best conform to accepted principles of international 
law rather than in derogation of them. 28 Penal clauses 
in treaties are odious and must be construed most strongly 
against those asserting them.29 · 
The treaty is one between tv1o sovereign nations-a 
treaty of peace. There is no place in it for any vindictive 
or punitive provisions. Germany must make compensa-
- Decision. tion and reparation for all losses falling within its terms 
sustained. by American nationals. That compensation 
must be full, adequate, and complete. To this extent 
Gern1any 'viii be held accountable. But this commission 
is vvithout po,ver to impose penalties for the use and 
benefit of private clairnants 'vhen the Government of 
the United States has exacted none. 
This decision in so far as applicable shall be determina-
tive of all cases grow-ing out of the sinking of the steam-
ship Lusitania. All awards in such cases shall be made 
as of this date and shall bear interest from this date at 
the rate of 5 per cent per annum. 
Done at Washington November 1, 1923. 
EDWIN B. PARKER, 
Umpire. 
Concurring in the conclusions: 
CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, 
American Commissioner. 
W. KIESSELBACH, 
German Commissioner. 
28 Opinion of Plumley, umpire, in Arao Mines (Ltd.) case, British-Venezuelan :rvnxed 
Claims Commission, pp. 344 and 386-387 Venezuelan Arbitrations 1903; reference to 
Sambiaggio case in note 27 above; Vilas v. Manila, 1911, 220 United States 345, 358-359; 
Crandall, sec. 170. 
~9 Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sees. 301-303; Crotius, Book II, Chap. XVI, Sec. X 
and par. 3 of Sec. XII. 
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OPINION CONSTRUING THE PHRASE "NAVAL AND 
MILITARY WORKS OR 1\IATERIALS" AS APPLIED TO 
HULL LOSSES AND ALSO DEALING WIT,H REQUISI-
TIONED DUTCH SHIPS 
March 25, 1924. 
(Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, p. 75) 
The United States of America on its own behalf, acting through the 
United States Shipping Board and/or the United States Shipping 
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and on behalf of certain 
of its nationals suffering losses at sea, v. Gerrnany. Docket 
Nos. 29, 127, and 546-556 inclusive. 
PARKER, Umpire, delivered the opinion of the com-
mission, the German Gommissioner concurring in the 
con~lusions, and the American commissioner concurring 
save as his dissent is indicated: 
There is here presented a group of 13 typical cases in 
which the United States, in some instances on its o'vn 
behalf and in others on behalf of certain of its nationals, 
is seeking compensation for losses suffered through the 
destruction of ships by Germany or her allies during the 
period of belligerency. These claims do not embrace 
damages resulting from loss of life, injuries to persons, 
or destruction of cargoes but are limited to losses of the 
ships themselves, sometimes hereinafter designated i( hull 
losses. '' 30 
With the exception of the construction and the ap- Li~itation of 
questwn. 
plication to requisitioned Dutch ships of the phrase 
"property * * * belonging to" as found in para-
graph 9 of Annex I to Section I of Part VIII of the 
treaty of Versailles as carried by reference into the 
treaty of Berlin, the sole question considered and decided 
in this opinion is: Were any or all of the 13 hulls in 
question when destroyed "naval and military 'vorks or 
materials" within the 'meaning of that phrase as used 
in that paragraph~ 
The cases in 'vhich an affirmative ans,ver to tb is 
question is given must, on final submission, be dismissed 
on the ground that Germany is not obligated to pay such 
losses under the treaty of Berlin. The cases in '\rhich 
a negative answer is given 'vill be reserved by the com-
mission for 'further consideration of the other issues 
raised. 
The commission is not here concerned 'vith the quality 
of the act causing the damage. 'l'ho torins of the treaty 
ao Reference is made to definition of terms rontnin~d in Administrative Decision No . I. 
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fix and limit Germany's obligations to pay, and the coin-
mission is not concerned with inquiring 'vhether the act 
for which she has accepted responsibility \VaS legal or 
illegal as measured by rules of international law. It is 
probable that a large percentage of the financial obliga-
tions imposed by said paragraph 9 would not arise under 
the rules of international law but are terms imposed by 
the victor as one of the conditions of peace. 
st!::c~i~~~s con- The phrase "naval and military works or materials" 
has no technical signification. It is not found in previous 
treaties. It has never been construed judicially or by any 
administrative authority save the reparation co1nmission. 
The construction by that body is not binding on this 
commission nor is it binding on Germany under the 
treaty of Berlin. It will, ho\vever, be considered by this 
commission as an early ex parte construction of this 
language of the treaty by the victorious European allies, 
who participated in drafting it and are the principal 
beneficiaries thereunder. 
The construction of this phrase is of first impression, 
and the commission must, in construing and applying it, 
look to its context. It is found in the principal reparation 
Treaty of Ver- provisions of the treaty of Versailles as embraced in 
sailles. . • . 
article 232 and the Annex I expressly referred to therein. 
That article, after reciting that the "allied and associated 
governinents recognize that the resources of Germany are 
not adequate * * * to make complete reparation 
for all" losses and damages to which they and their 
nationals had been subjected as a consequence of the \Var, 
provides that: 
"The allied and associated Governments, ho\vever, 
require, and Germany undertakes, that she \vill make 
compensation for all damage done to the civilian popula-
tion of the allied and associ a ted po,vers and to their 
property during the period of the belligerency of each 
as an allied or associated power against Germany by 
such aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and in 
general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto." 
Reparation It is apparent that the controlling consideration in the 
minds of the draftsmen of this article \Vas that Germany 
should be required to make compensation for all damages 
suffered by the civilian pop1.tlation of each of the allied 
and associated powers during the period of its belligerency. 
It \Vas the reparation of the private losses sustained by the 
civilian population that \vas uppermost in the minds of 
NAVAL AND MILITARY WORKS OR. MATERIAL 
the makers of the treaty rather than the public losses of 
the governments of the allied and associated powers 'vhich 
represented the cost to them of prosecuting the war.32 
Article 232 n1akes express reference to "Annex I 
hereto" as more particularly defining the damages for 
which Germany is obligated to make compensation. 
Annex I provides that "compensation may be claimed 
from Germany under article 232 above in respect of the 
total damage under the follovving categories." Then 
follows an enumeration of 10 categories, of which Nos. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 10 deal solely with damages suffered by 
the civilian populations of the allied and associated 
powers. Categories 5, 6, and 7 deal with reimbursement 
to the governments of the allied and associated powers as 
such of the cost to them of pension and separation allow-
ances, rather than damages suffered by the "civilian 
population." The Governinent of the United States has 
expressly committed itself against presenting claims 
arising under these three categories.33 There remains of 
the 10 categories enumerated in Annex I only category 9, 
which reads: 
"(9) Damage in respect of all property wherever situ-
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ated belonging to any of the allied or associated states lasE x c e Pte d 
c s. 
or their nationals, with the exception of naval and military 
works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, 
injured or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her allies 
on land, on sea, or from the air, or damage directly in 
consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war." 
Under the terms of this paragraph arise Germany's 
financial obligations, if any, to pay the claims novv before 
this commission for the hulls destroyed during the period 
of belligerency. 
It can not be doubted that the language of this para-
graph 9 so expands that used in article 232 as to include Government 
. l . property. 
certain property osses sustained by the governments of 
the allied and associated po,vers as well as the losses sus-
tained by their "civilian populations." It 'vas found that 
32 The reparations provided for in the exchange of notes bet ween the United States 
and German~ eulminating in the armistiee of November 11 , 1918, executed by t he mili-
tary representatives of the belligerent powers, were limited to reparations for losses to 
the eivilian population. The Lansing note of November 5, 1918, provides that the allied 
powers "understand that eompensat ion will be made by Germany for all damage done 
to the cil'ilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany 
by land, by sea, and from the air." 
ltalies appearing throughout t his op~ nion nre, as a rule, added by the commission. 
33 See note 11 of Administ rati ve Decision No. 11 , pp. 14 and 15 of Decisions and 
Opinions of this commission. 
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"Materials." 
property belonging to the victorious po,vers not designed 
or used for military purposes had been destroyed or dam-
aged, so in addition to requiring that Germany compen-
sate the civilian. population for their property losses this 
paragraph requires that Germany shall also compensate 
those governments for government losses suffe~ed through 
destruction or damage with respect to property of a non-
military character. Much property belonging to the 
governments of the victorious po\vers, especially to the 
governments of the European allies, and not impressed 
by reason of its inherent nature or of its use \Vith a military 
character, had been destroyed or damaged. Under this 
provision it is clear that Germany is obligated to com-
pensate the governn1ents suffering such losses. But, 
reading the reparation provisions as a \vhole, it is equally 
clear that the allied and associated po,vers did not intend 
to require that Ger1nany should compensate them, and 
that Germany is not obligated to compensate them, for 
losses suffered by them resulting from the destruction or 
damage of property impressed with a military character 
either by reason of its inherent nature or by the use to 
which it was devoted at the time of the loss. Property 
so impressed with a military character is embraced within 
the phrase "naval and military works or materials" as 
used in paragraph 9, which class described by this phrase 
will sometimes hereinafter be referred to as "excepted 
class.'' 
This phrase, in so far as it applies to hulls for the loss of 
which claims are presented to this commission, relates 
solely to ships operated by the United States, not as 
merchantmen, but directly in furtherance of a military 
operation against Germany or her allies. A ship pri-
vately operated for private profit can not be impressed 
with a military character, for only the government can 
lawfully engage in direct warlike activities. 
By the terms of the treaty of Versailles, the French and 
English texts are both authentic. The French \VOTd 
"materiel," in the singular, is used in the French text, 
against which the English \Vord "materials," in the plural, 
is used in the English text. Littre, \Vhose dictionary is 
accepted as an authority on the French language, defines 
"materiel" thus: "'!''he articles of all kinds taken as a 
whole \Vhich arc used for some public service in contra-
distinction to personnel," and he gives as an example 
MATERIALS 
materiel of an army, the baggage, ammunition, etc., as 
distinguished from the men. 
The Century Dictionary defines this French \vord 
thus: "The assemblage or totality of things used or 
needed in carrying on any complex business or operation, 
in distinction from the personnel, or body of persons, 
employed in the same: applied more especially to military 
supplies and equipments, as arms, ammunition, baggage, 
provisions, horses, wagons, etc." · 
The English word "materials" means the constituent 
or component parts of a product or "that of or with 
which any corporeal thing is or may be constituted, made, 
or done" (Century Dictionary). 
Reading the French and English texts together, it is 
apparent that the word "materials" is here used in a 
broad and all inclusive sense, \Vith respect to all physical 
properties not attached to the soil, pertaining to either 
the naval or land forces and impressed with a military 
character; while the word "works" connotes physical 
properties attached to the soil, sometimes designated in 
military parlance as "installations," such as forts, naval 
coast defenses, arsenals, dry docks, barracks, canton-
ments, and similar structures. The term "materials" 
as here used includes raw products, semifinished prod-
ucts, and finished products, implements, instruments, 
appliances, and equipment, embracing all movable 
property of a physical nature from the ra\V material to 
the completed implement, apparatus, equipment, or 
unit, whether it were an ordinary hand grenade or a 
completed and fully equipped warship, provided that it 
was used by either the naval or land forces of the United 
States in direct furtherance of a military operation against 
Germany or her allies. 
While it is difficult if not impossible to so clearly define 
the phrase "naval and military \Vorks or materials" that 
the definition can be readily applied to the facts of every 
claim for the loss of a hull pending before this commission, 
the true test stated in general terms is: Was the ship 
when destroyed being operated by the United States for 
purposes directly in furtherance of a military operation 
against Germany or her allies~ If it \Vas so operated, 
then it is embraced \vi thin the excepted class and Germany 
is not obligated to pay the loss. If it \vas not so operated, 
it is not embraced \vithin the excepted class and Germany 
is obligated to pay the loss. 
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The United States Shipping Board (sometimes herein-
after referred to as "Shipping Board") exerted such a 
far-reaching influence over American shipping both prior 
to and during the period of American belligerency that 
the scope and effect of its activities and powers must be 
clearly understood in order to reach sound conclusions 
with respect to the cases here under consideration. 
B s hdi P P i n g The Shipping Board v1as established in pursuance of the oar . 
.. act of the Congress of the United States of September 7, 
1916 (39 Statutes at Large, 728), entitled "An act to 
establish a United States Shipping Board for the purpose 
of encouraging, developing, and creating a naval auxiliary 
and naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the 
requirements of the commerce of the United States with 
its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries; 
to regulate carriers by water engaged in the foreign and 
interstate commerce of the United States; and for other 
purposes." The act as amended provided that the 
members of the board should be appointed by the Presi-
dent subject to confirmation by the Senate; that they 
should be selected with due regard for the efficient dis-
charge of the duties imposed on them by the act; that 
two should be appointed from States touching the Pacific 
O~ean, t"\VO from States touching the Atlantic Ocean, 
one from States touching the Gulf of Mexico, one from 
States touching the Great Lakes, and one from · the 
interior, but that not more than one should be appointed 
from the same State and not more than four from the 
same political party. All employees of the board \Vere 
selected from lists supplied by the Civil Service Commis-
sion and in accordance with the civil-service law. The 
board was authorized to have constructed and equipped, 
as well as "to purchase, lease: or charter, vessels suitable, 
as far as the commercial requirements of the marine trade 
of the United ~tates may permit, for use as naval auxil-
iaries or Army transports, or for other naval or military 
purposes." 
The President was authorized to transfer "either per-
manently or for limited periods to the board such vessels 
belonging to the War or Navy Department as are suitable 
~for commercial uses and not required for military or naval 
use in time of peace." 
Provision was made for the American registry and 
enrollment of vessels purchased, chartered, or leased from 
the board and it was provided that "Such vessels while 
SHIPPING BOARD 
e'lnployed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all 
laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant 
vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as 
owner, in 'vhole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or 
other interest therein." 
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The board was authorized to create a corporation with ti!I.cet Corpora· 
a capital stock of not to exceed $50,000,000 "for the 
purchase, construction, equip1nent, lease, charter, main-
tenance, and operation of merchant vessels in the conunerce 
o.f the United States." In pursuance of this latter pro-
vision the United States Shipping Board En1ergency 
Fleet Corporation (sometimes hereinafter referred to as 
"Fleet Corporation") 'vas organized under the la,vs of 
the District of Columbia "\Vith a capital stock of $50,000,-
000, all fully paid and all held and o"rned by the United 
States save the qualifying shares of the trustees. l Jndcr 
the terms of the act, this corporation could not engage 
in the operation of vessels o'vned or controlled by it 
unless the board should be unable to contract 'vith citizens 
of the United States for the purchase or operation thereof. 
Then followed in the act numerous provisions clothing 
the board 'vith broad powers with respect to transpor-
tation by water of passengers ~r property ip interstate 
and foreign commerce, provisions for investigations and 
hearings, for the fixing of maximum rates, and for 
penalties for failure to observe the terms of the statutes 
and the orders of the board. 
The act as amended provided that it "may be cited as 
'shipping act, 1916.' " The board created by virtue of 
its terms possessed none of the indicia of a military 
tribunal. Its members, all civilians, were dra,vn from 
remote sections, that the board might represent the com-
mercial and shipping interests of the entire Nation. The 
act taken in its entirety indicates that the controlling 
purpose of the Congress wa·s to promote the developmcn t 
of an American merchari·t marine and also "as .far as the 
cor11mercial requirements of the marine trade of the United 
States may permit" provide vessels susceptible of "usc 
as naval auxiliaries or Ar1ny transports, or for other 
naval or military purposes". 'fhis act "\Vas approved 
September 7, 1016, during the period of An1crican 
neutrality. The \Vorld War had found American 
nationals engaged in an extensive foreign commerce but 
without an adequate merchant marine to keep it afloat. 
'l'he channels of An1erican foreign commerce 'vould have 
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Rcq uisit loo. 
been choked but for the use of belligerent bottoms 'vith 
the resultant risks. This situation, coupled 'vith the 
possibility of the developments of the war forcing 
American participation therein, prompted the enactment 
of this statute for the creation of a merchant marine and 
setting up the n1achinery for the mobilization and 
control of all American shipping. 
Following America's entrance into the war on April 6, 
1917, Congress through the enactment of several statutes 
· clothed the President of the United States 'vith broad 
powers including the taking over of title or possession 
by purchase or requisition of construc.tecl vessels or parts 
thereof or charters therein and the operation, management 
and disposition of such vessels and all other vessels 
theretofore or thereafter acquired by the United States. 
From time to time through Executive orders the President 
being thereunto duly authorized, delegated these po,vers 
'vith respect to shipping to the Shipping Board, to be 
exercised directly by it or, in its discretion, by it through 
the Fleet Corporation. 
Under these powers the Shipping Board and the Fleet 
Corporation proceeded to req-qisition the use of all power-
driven steal cargo vessels of American registry of 2,500 
tons dead weight or over and all passenger vessels of 
American registry of 2,500 tons gross registry or over 
adapted to ocean service. Immediately upon the execu-
tion of these requisition orders a "requisition charter" 
was entered in to between the Shipping Board and the 
o'vner, fixing the compensation to be paid by the' United 
States to the owner for the use of the vessel and provid-
ing for the operation of the vessel on 'vhat was known 
as the "time-form" basis, the board reserving the right 
to change the charter to a "bare-boat" basis on giving 
five days' notice. The time-form basis provided for the 
operation of the vessel by the owner as agent of the United 
States and fixed the terms and conditions of such opera-
tion, stipulating, among other things, that the O"\\rner should 
pay all expenses of operation, including the w·ages and 
fees of the master, officers, and cre,v, and should assume 
all marine risks, including collision liabilities, but that the 
United States should assume all 'var risks. The Shipping 
Board directed the O"'\Vne,r as its agent to operate the vessel 
in its regular trade. The bare-boat basis •provided that 
all the expenses of 1nanning, victualling, and supplying the 
vessel and all other costs of operation should be borne by 
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the United States. This latter form \Vas used in requisi-
tioning ships for service in the War Department, and also 
in some other instances where requisitioned ships were 
delivered by the Shipping Board to third parties to oper-
ate as agents of the United States. \Vhen a ship was de-
livered by the Shipping Board to the War Department 
no formal agreement \Vas entered into between these t\VO 
Governn1ent agencies, but the vVar Department recog-
nized the agreement between the Shipping Board and 
the owner of the vessel and duly accounted to the Ship-
ping Board under the terms and conditions of the requisi-
tion charter. 
vVhen the requisitioned vessel was redelivered to the 
owner for operation by him under a time-form requisition 
charter, an ''operating agreement'' was also enter·ed into 
between the Fleet Corporation, acting for the United 
States, and the owner, \Vhereby the o\vner as agent of 
the Fleet Corporation undertook the operation of the 
vessel, including the procurement of cargoes and the 
physical control of the ship. For these services the O\Vner 
as agent received stipulated fees and commissions in ad-
dition to the compensation which he received as O\Vncr 
for the use of the vessel as provided in the requisition 
charter. 
\Vhen the vessel was requisitioned under a bare-boat 
form charter and delivered to a third party other than 
an established government agency to operate, a "manag-
ing agreement" was entered in to bet,veen the Fleet Cor-
poration and such third party whereby the latter as 
agent for the Fleet Corporation assumed physical control 
of the ship, :receiving fees and commissions for such 
services. 
It was not the practice of the Shipping Board or the 
Fleet Corporation to issue detailed and minute instruc-
.tions to agents operating requisitioned vessels with re-
spect to the conduct of the particular voyage or the 
particular cargoes \vhich such vessels should carry. These 
operating or managing agents \Vere selected because of 
their experience and ability in handling commercial ship-
ping. While the United States reserved to itself full 
power and authority to exercise complete control over 
vessels requisitioned by it, such control \Vas in practice 
delegated to the operating or managing agent, \vho ex-
ercised his sound discretion in the management of ships 
operated by him as agent, \vith a vie'v to preventing any 
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unnecessary dislocation of trade or disturbance 1n the 
established channels of commerce. 
Thus the United States through the agencies of the 
Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation effectively 
and speedily mobilized all American shipping, exercising 
such control over it that, as emergency required, it could 
be immediately utilized by the Unite.d States in the 
prosecution of its military operations against its enemies; 
but pending such emergency the requisitioned vessels 
were commercially operated, by their owners or by third 
parties, as agents of the United States, and these agents 
'vere given the greatest latitude and freedom of action 
in the management and control of vessels operated by 
them in order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance 
in the free move1nent of commerce. Under the requisi-
tion charter it was expressly stipulated that the vessel 
"shall not have the status of a public ship, and shall be 
subject to all laws and regulations governing merchant 
vessels * * *. When, however, the requisitioned vessel 
is engaged in the service of the War or Navy Department, the 
vessel shall have the status of a public ship, and * * * 
the master, officers, and crew shall become the immediate 
employees and agents of the United States, with all the 
rights and duties of such, the vessel passing completely 
into the possession and the master, officers, and cre'v ab-
solutely under the control of the United States." At 
another point in the requisition charter it was stipulated 
that the master "shall be the agent of the owner in all 
matters respecting the management, handling, and navi-
gation of the vessel, except when the vessel becomes a public 
ship." 
The German agent contends that presu.mptively the 
control by the Shipping Board thus exercised over vessels, 
acit!itary char- whether owned by the United States or held by the United 
States under requisition, was in furtherance of the con-
duct of the military effort of the United States against 
Germany, and hence-in the absence of satisfactory 
proof to the contrary, the burden being on the United 
States-all such vessels 1nust be classed as "naval and 
military works or materials." 1'he conunission has no 
hesitation in rejecting this contention. After A1nerica 
entered the war, its entire commerce and industry " .,.ere 
in a broad sense 1nobilized for 'var. Because of the 
urgent war requiren1ents, 8teel and nu1nerous other 
products beeame govern1nent-controlled coininodities, 
MILITARY WORKS 
their uses being rigidly restricted to war purposes. Yet 
it can not be contended that the fact that an American 
steel plant was operated 100 per cent on war work raised 
a prima facie presumption of its conversion into "military 
works." The railroads of the United States were taken 
over and operated by the Government as a war measure, 
but this did not presumptively convert them into "mili-
tary works or materials" within the meaning of that term 
as used in the treaty of Versailles. Nor can the mobiliza-
tion for 'var of American shipping through the agency of 
the Shipping Board create even a rebuttable presumption 
that the vessels so Inobilized, whether owned or req ui-
sitioned by the United States, had a military character. 
Nothing short of their operation by the United States 
directly in furtherance of a military operation against 
Germany can have such an effect. So long as such vessels 
were performing the functions of merchant vessels, even 
though engaged in a service incidei1t to the existence of a 
state of war; they will not fall within the excepted class. 
Construing the shipping act, the Executive orders of 
the President, and the provisions of an operating agree-
ment similar to that hereinbefore described, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held a vessel owned by the 
Fleet Corporation but operated by an American national 
as an agent of the Shipping Board was a merchant vessel 
and subject to libel in admiralty for the consequences of 
a collision.34 It is apparent that a vessel either o'vned or 
r.equisitioned by the Shipping Board or Fleet Corporation 
and operated by an agent of the United States under such 
an operating or managing agreement as hereinbefore 
described was a merchant1nan and in no sense impressed 
with a military character. 
When, ho,vever, the Shipping Board delivered such 
vessels to either the War Department or the Navy 
Department of the United States their status at once 
changed and they became public ships; their masters, 
officers, and crews at once became employees and agents 
of the United States with all of the resultant rights and 
duties; and it will be presumed .that such delivery 'vas 
made to the military arn1s of the Go~ernment to enable 
them to be used (in the language of section 5 of the 
shipping act) "as naval auxiliares or army transports, 
or for other naval or military p11rposes ." Such assignment 
of vessels to and their operation by the ''r ar Department 
u The Lake .Monroe (1919) 250 U . S. 246. 
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or the Navy Department will be treated by the commis-
sion as prima facie but not conclusive evidence of their 
military or naval character. The facts in each case 'viii 
be carefully examined and \veighed by the commission 
in order to determine whether or not the particular ship, 
at the time of her destruction was operated by the United 
States directly in furtherance of a miliatry operation 
against Germany or her allies. If she was so operated, 
she will fall within the excepted class; otherwise she will 
not. 
The application of this general rule to the facts as 
disclosed by the records in the 13 typical cases. prelim-
inarily submitted will illustrate its scope ~nd its limita-
tions. 
Case No. 127, steamship Rockingham 
steamer Rock- The steamship Rockingham, ~nvned and operated by the 
inuham. Garland Steamship Corporation, an American national, 
sailed on ·April 16, 1917, from Baltimore, Md., via Nor-
folk, Va., which she left April .19, bound for Liverpool, 
England, v;ith a general cargo for numerous consignees. 
Facts of case. She was armed for defensive purposes \vith tv;ro 4-inch 
guns, one fore and one aft, manned by a civilian crew of 
36, and in addition had a naval gun cre'v of 13 enlisted 
men. She was sunk by a German submarine on May 1, 
1917, before reaching Liverpool. In the early part of the 
afternoon of May 1, the weather being hazy, two small 
. objects were sighted by the Rockingham at a distance of 
approximately 5 miles, one on the starboard bo\v, the 
other on the port quarter, and assuming that they were 
German submarines the master steered a zig-zag course 
in accordance 'vith instructions issued by the United 
States Navy Department designed to elude the opera-
tions of hostile subn1arines. The two objects \Vere seen 
to submerge and thereafter were not sighted until after 
the sinking. The gun crew of the Rockingham had, 
therefore, no target to fire upon, and no effort was made 
at resistance. 'l'he attack was upon the starboard side, 
was made without \Varning the torpedo entering the 
engine room, tearing a great hole in the ship and causing 
her to sink in 25 minutes. 
The German agent contends that the Rockingharlf. at 
the time of her destruction had lost her status as a 
private peaceful trading ship and had become "naval 
and 1nilitary * * * materials" as that term is used 
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in the treaty because: (1) she was armed, (2) her guns 
were manned by a navai gun crew, (3) she \vas operated 
in accordance with instructions given by the Navy 
Department of the United States although by a civilian 
n1aster with a civilian cre,v. The contention is that, 
notwithstanding such arming and manning and operation 
1nay have been entirely legal and justified, they never-
theless stripped the Rockingham of her character of a 
peaceful merchantman and impressed her with a military 
character. 
This contention must be rejected. It is clear that the 
Roclcingha1n was being privately operated by an Ameri-
can national for private profit. She was armed in pur-
suance of the policy adopted by the Government of the 
United States, of which all foreign missions in Washing-
ton were given formal notice on March 12, 1917, during 
the period of American neutrality, in the following 
language: 
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"In view of the announcement of the Imperial German Arming or 
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Government on January 31, 1917, that all ships, those 
of neutrals included, met \vithin certain zones of the 
high seas would be sunk without any precautions being 
taken for the safety of the persons on board, and without 
the exercise of visit and search, the Government of the 
United States. has determined to place upon all American 
merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an 
armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the 
lives of the persons on board." 
The instructions given by theN avy Department of the 
United States to the masters of these merchant vessels 
and to the commanders of the naval gun crews clearly 
indicate that the purpose of so arming and operating 
such vessels was to protect against the offensive operations 
of German submarines and to elude or escape from them 
if possible, and not to initiate offensive operations against 
such submarines. The control in the nature of routing 
instructions \vhich the civilian masters received from the 
Navy Department and followed 'vas designed to avoid 
and to escape from the submarine, not to seek them out 
and destroy them~ 
The arming for defensive purposes of a merchantman 
and the manning of such armament by a naval gun cre\v, 
coupled with the routing of such ship by the Navy 
Department of the United States for the purpose of 
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avoiding the danger of submarines and the following by 
the civilian master of the ship of instructions given by 
the Navy Department for the defense of the ship \vhen 
in danger of attack by submarines, certainly do not 
change the juridical status of the ship or convert it 
from a merchant ship to a war ship or make of it naval 
material. 
Decision . The commission holds that the Rockingham. at the 
time of her destruction was being operated as a merchant 
vessel and that she does not fall within the excepted class. 
The .Motano. Case No. 551, steamship .... Mota no-oil tanker 
The steamship Molano, owned and operated by the 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, an American national, 
sailed from New York on July 6, 1917, \vith a cargo of fuel 
oil for account of the British ship control for use of the 
British Admiralty. She left Plymouth v1ith other vessels 
convoyed by three British destroyers for Portsmouth, 
Facts or case. England, as her final discharge port. She was armed for 
defensive purposes with two 3-inch guns, one fore and one 
aft, and had a civilian master and crew of 33 men and a 
gun cre\v of 13 enlisted men of the United States Navy. 
She was sunk on July 31, 1917, on her voyage between 
Plymouth and Portsmouth by a torpedo fired by a Ger-
man submarine. The air was hazy, the sea· choppy, the 
submarine had not been sighted, and no resistance \vas 
made by the naval gun crew. The Molano was insured 
with the British Government for $616,000, \vhich sum has 
been paid to the claimant, and this clain1 is made for the 
difference between that amount and the true value of the 
vessel, which difference is placed at the sum of $594,000, 
plus interest and expenses. 
The German agent contends that the Molano at the 
time of her destruction constituted "naval * * * 
works or materials" because (1) she carried armament 
susceptible of usc for hostile purposes and \vas manned 
by a naval gun cre\v, (2) she was convo ycd by regular 
fighting forces of a belligerent po\ver, and (3) she \vas con-
trolled by the belligerent British Govern1ncnt and used 
for warlike purposes. The commission rejects this con-
tention because it is apparent that the .... Molano \vas pri-
vately owned and privately operated for private profit, 
was not employed or designed to be employed directly in 
furtherance of a military operation of the United States 
ENEMY CONVOY 203 
or its associated powers against Ger1nany or her allies, 
and '\vas not impressed with a military character. 
We have heretofore exan1ined the test of armament 
manned by a naval gun crew on a privately operated 
comn1ercial ship and held .that it did not have the effect 
of converting such ship into naval material. 
The German agent \Vith great earnestness and ability Encmyconvoy 
insists that a ship associating itself '\vith a belligerent 
convoy assumes the character of its associates and 
that '\vhcn it becon1es a part of the convoy flotilla, 
which is a military unit and subject to navai instruc-
tions and naval control, it participates in hostilities 
and 1nust be classed as naval material. We have no 
quarrel \vith the contention that· a vessel, whether neu-
tral or belligerent, for1ning part of a convoy under bel-
ligerent escort may, through the n1ethods prescribed by 
international la'\v, be la·wfully condemned and destroyed 
as a belligerent. But that is not the question before 
this commission. If \Ve assume that the Motano-a 
belligerent merchantman-was lawfully destroyed, this 
does not affect the result. The fact that the lfotano, 
because of its helpless and nonmilitary character, sought 
the protection of a convoy and voluntarily subjected 
itself to naval in'structions as to routing and operation, for 
the purpose of avoiding the German submarines rather 
than seeking them out to engage them in' combat, cer-
tainly can not, by some mysterious and alchemic process, 
have the effect of transforming the ship from a merchant-
man into naval material. The control exercised by the 
British Government over the Motano was not such as to 
affect its status. Such control was limited to directions 
looking to the protection of the vessel and the further-
ance of its commercial activities, and not directly in fur-
therance of any military operation against Germany for 
her allies. 
The C'Oinmission therefore concludes that the Motano Decision. 
at the ti1ne of her destruction maintained her character 
as a peaceful comn1ercial vessel and that she docs not. 
fall within the excepted class. 
Case No. 29, steamship Pinar del Rio 
The steamship Pinar del Rio, O\vned by the American P inardel RioJ 
'-\:; Cuban Steamship Line (Inc.), an American national , 
\Vas requisitioned by the United States through the 
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The Rochester . 
Shipping Board, and a time-form requisition charter was 
entered into February 4, 1918. By the terms of this 
charter the owner became the agent of the Shipping 
Board and as such continued to operate the ship. She 
was unarmed and manned by a civilian crc,v. While en 
route from Cuba to Boston wl.th a cargo of sugar she 
was sunk, on June 8, 1918, through gunfire by a German 
submarine. 
It is apparent that at the time of her destruction she 
was being operated as a merchant vessel and in no sense 
impressed 'vith a military character. She does not, 
therefore, fall within the excepted class. 
Case No. 550, steamship Rochester 
The steamship Rochester, owned and operated by the 
Rochester Navigation Corporation, an American na-
tional, after having discharged a general cargo at Man-
·chester, England, sailed from that port in ballast October 
26, 1917. She was armed for defensive purposes 'vith 
two 3-inch guns, mounted one fore and one aft, and had 
a civilian crew of 36 men and a naval gun crew .. of 13 
men. After leaving Manchester she 'vith nine other 
merchantmen was convoyed for several days by five 
destroyers and one armed cruiser, and, after the convoy-
ing ships returned to their base, the Rochester 'vas sunk 
on November 2, 1917, by a torpedo and shells fired from 
a German submarine. 
It is apparent that the Rochester at the time of her 
destruction was being operated as a merchant vessel and 
was not in any sense impressed 'vith a military character. 
The commission, therefore, finds that the Rochester does 
not fall within the excepted class. 
Case No. 555, steamship Moreni-oil tanker 
The Moreni. The steamship Moreni, o'vned and operated by the 
Standard Oil Co. of Ne'v Jersey, an American national, 
sailed from Baton Rouge, La., May 19, 1917, 'vith a 
cargo of gasoline consigned to the Italian-American Oil 
Co., at Savona, Italy, to call at Gibraltar for orders. 
She was armed for defensive purposes w-ith t'vo 4-inch 
guns, one fore and one aft, and manned 'vith a civilian 
crew of 35 and a naval gun crew of 12. 1\..fter call-
ing at Gibraltar for orders she sailed from that port 
June 10, 1917, and on the morning of June 12 'vas fired 
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upon and finally sunk by a German submarine after a 
running fight in which the Moreni endeavored to escape 
and in which 200 to 250 shots were fired by the submarine 
and about 150 shots by the Moreni. 
It is apparent that the Jforeni was at the time of her 
destruction being privately operated for private profit as 
a merchant vessel, and for the reasons heretofore given 
the commission holds that she does not fall within the 
~xcepted class. 
Case No. 549, steamship Alamance 
The steamship Alamance, owned by the G~rland Steam-
ship Corporation, an American national, was requisi-
tioned by the Shipping Board October 20, 1917, and at 
once redelivered to the Garland Steamship Corporation 
under a time-form requisition charter, executed Decem-
ber 28, 1917, by the terms of which the owner operated 
the vessel as agent of the Shipping Board. She "'"as 
manned with a civilian crew of 38 men, armed for defen-
sive purposes with two 4-inch guns, one fore and one aft, 
which \Vere manned by a naval gun crew of 19 men. On 
February 5, 1918, while en route from Hampton Roads, 
Va., to Liverpool, England, with a cargo consisting prin-
cipally of tobacco, cotto:Q., zinc, and lumber, and while in 
a convoy of 15 ships escorted by naval vessels, she \Vas 
torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. 
For the reasons heretofore given the commission holds 
that at the time of her destruction the Alamance was a 
merchant vessel and that she does not fall within the 
excepted class. 
Case No. 553, steamship Tyler 
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The steamship Tyler, owned by the Old Dominion The Tf)ler. 
Steamship Co., of New York, an American national, \vas 
requisitioned by the Shipping Board November 29, 1917, 
and a time-form requisition charter executed on January 
4, 1918. On ~A:arch 2, 1918, the Shipping Board entered 
into an operating agreement \vith Chase Leaveth & Co. 
by the terms of \Vhich they operated the Tyler as agent 
of the Shipping Board, and she \Vas being so operated at 
the time of her destruction. She \Vas manned by a 
civilian cre\Y, armed for defensive purposes \vith t\vo 
3-inch guns, one fore and one aft, \vhich were manned by 
a naval gun crew of 19 men. On April 30, 1918, the 
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Tyler left Genoa, Italy, in convoy, bound for New York 
in ballast. On May 2, 1918, she was sunk by torpedoes 
fired by a German submarine. 
For the reasons hereinabove given the commission 
holds that at the time of her destruction the Tyler 'vas a 
merchantman in no sense impressed 'vith a military char-
acter, and hence is not within the excepted class. 
Case No. 554, steamship Santa llfaria-oil tanker 
The steamship Santa ],faria, owned by the Sun Co., an 
American national, was requisitioned by the Shipping 
Board October 12, 1917, delivered on January 14~ 1918, 
and on the same day redelivered to the owner, which 
operated her as agent of the Shipping Board under a 
requisition agreement constituting a part of the requisi-
tion charter. She sailed from Chester, Pa., the latter 
part of January, 1918, via Norfolk, Va., bound for Great 
Britain in convoy 'vith a cargo of fuel oil. She 'vas man-
ned by a civilian crew of 39 men, armed 'vith t'vo 4-inch 
guns, one fore and one aft, and had a naval gun crew of 
22 men. On February 25, while under convoy of British 
trawlers, she was sunk by a torpedo fired by a German 
submarine. 
The commission holds that at the time of her destruc-
tion the Santa Maria was a merchant vessel and that she 
does not fall 'vithin the excepted class. 
Case No. 552, steamship Meralc 
The Mtrak, By virtue of a proclamation of the President of the 
United States of March 20, 1918, 87 vessels of Holland 
registry and belonging to her nationals, lying in American 
ports, were, in accordance with international law and 
practice, requisitioned by the United States, the President 
in his proclamation directing that the Shipping Board 
"make to the owners thereof full compensation, in ac-
cordance 'vith the principles of international la,v." Of 
these vessels 46, including the steamships -~ffrak and 
T~xel, were delivered to the Shipping Board. 
The Meralc 'vas operated as a merchantman by W esse I 
Dn \Tal & Co., American nationals, as agents of the Ship-
ping Board. She sailed under the American flag, '.vas 
unarmed, and 'vas manned by a civilian cre,v. While en 
route from Norfolk, Va., to Chile with a cargo of 4,000 
tons of coal she 'vas, on August 6, 1918, captured by a 
Ger1nan submarine and sunk by bo1nbs. 
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Case No. 556, steamship Texel 
As appears from the statement made in connection with 
the Merak case supra, the steamship Texel was one of the 
Dutch ships requisitioned by the United States and as-
signed to the Shipping Board, after which she was oper-
ated by the New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co. as 
agent for the Shipping Board. She "ras unarmed and 
manned by a civilian crew. She sailed under the· Ameri-
can flag from Ponce, P. R., on May 27, 1918, for New 
York with a cargo of sugar. On June 2, she was attacked 
by a German submarine, overhauled, and sunk by bombs. 
It is apparent that the steamships Merak and Texel 
\vere at the time of their destruction being operated as 
merchant vessels and in no sense impressed with a mili-
tary character. For the reasons heretofore given the 
commission holds that neither the steamship Jferak nor 
the steamship Texel falls vlithin the excepted class, and 
that neither can in any sense be held to have constituted 
"naval and military works or materials" as that phrase 
is used in the treaty. 
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But notwithstanding this holding the German agent "Belonging. to." 
contends that these claims do not fall within the terms 
of the treaty of Berlin because these Dutch ships were not 
vessels "belonging to" the United States or its nationals 
as that term is used in the paragraph 9 here under con-
sideration. That these ships \Vere lawfully requisitioned, 
reduced to possession, and operated by the 'United States 
is conceded by Germany. It results that at the time of 
their destruction the right of the United States to possess 
and use them against all the world \Vas absolute and 
superior to any possible contingent rights or interests of 
those Dutch nationals who o\vned them at the time they 
were requisitioned. That the United States had at least 
a special or qualified property in these ships there can be 
no doubt. They were lawfully in its possession, sailing 
under its flag, used as it saw fit without regard to the 
wishes of the former owners and during an emergency 
the duration of \vhich the United States alone could deter-
mine. There never was a time v1hen the Dutch nationals 
'vho owned the ships at the tin1e they \Vere requisitioned 
could, as a matter of right, demand their return or impose 
any limitation \vhatsoevcr upon their operation or con-
trol. As the United States had the absolute right against 
the whole \vorld to possess these ships and use them as it 
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sa"\v fit, conditioned only upon the duty to n1ake adequate 
compensation for their use and to return them, at a time 
to be determined by it or in the alternative to make ade-
quate compensation, to the Dutch nationals who O"\vned 
them at the time they were requisitioned, certain it is 
that this amounted to a special or qualified property in 
the ships tantamount to absolute ownership thereof for 
the time being. The possession of the United States was 
analagous to that of a grantee having an estate defeasible 
upon the happening of some event completely within his 
control. 
Where under the terms of a trip or time charter the 
holder of the legal title delivers to the charterer the 'vhole 
possession and control of the ship, the charterer becomes 
the ''owner" thereof during the term of the charter and 
is designated as such.35 The British merchant shipping 
(salvage) act, 1916, provides that: "Where salvage serv-
ices are rendered by any ship belonging to His 111ajesty 
* * * the Admiralty shall * * * be entitled to 
claim salvage * * * and shall have the same rights 
and remedies as if the ship * * * did not belong to 
His Majesty." The English courts have held that a 
ship requisitioned and operated by the government under 
requisition charter "belonged to" His Majesty within 
the terms of this act and hence was entitled to salvage.36 
These decisions "\Vhile helpful are not coNtrolling in con-
struing the phrase ''Damage in respect of all property 
wherever situated belonging to" the ·United States or its 
nationals. "Belonging to". as here used is not a term of 
art or a technical legal term. It must be construed in 
the popular sense in which the word is ordinarily used, 
as synonymous with appertaining to, connectrd with, 
having special relation to. That it was used in this 
sense is evidenced by reference to this clause of the 
French text of the treaty of Versailles, "\vhich reads: 
'' Dommages relatifs a toutes proprietes, en quelque lieu 
qu'elles soient situees, appartenant a." The use of the 
"\Vord "appartenant" is significant. The expression 
''belonging to" does not necessarily convey the idea that 
as Sandeman v. Scurr (1866), L. n. 2 Q. D. 86; ~farcardier v. Chesapeake Insurance Co. 
(1814), 8 Cranch 39, 49; Reed v. United States (1871), 11 'Vallace 591, GOO; Leary v. United 
States (1872), 14 'Vallace 607, 610; Kent's Commentaries, 14th edition, Vol. III, p. *138; 
Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 11th (1923) edition, art. 2, pp. 4-9. 
36 Admiralty Commissioners v. Page and others (1918), 2 K. B. 447, affirmed in (1919) 
1 K. B. 299. See also The Sarpen, Court of Appeal (1916), Probate Division, 306, 313; 
~faster of Trinity House v. Clark (1815), 4 M. & S. 288. 
BARE-BOAT REQUISITION 
the indefeasible legal title to the property "in respect 
of" which the damage occurred must have vested in the 
United States or its nationals. It is sufficient that the 
United States or its nationals had such control over and 
interest, general or special, in such property as that 
injury or damage to it directly resulted in loss to them. 
Had the draftsmen of the treaty intended to restrict 
Germany's obligations to pay for damages to property in 
which the unconditional legal title was vested in the 
allied or associated States or their nationals, they would 
have used apt and well-recognized terms to express such 
limitation. On the contrary, .it is evident from reading 
the reparation provisions as a \vhole that their purpose 
and intention was to require Germany to pay all losses 
sustained by the allied or associated States or their 
nationals resulting from "damage in respect of all prop-
erty wherever situated" of a nonmilitary character. 
While not controlling, it is interesting to note that the 
Reparation Commission has placed a similar construction 
on the language in question, and gone a step farther than 
here indica ted in holding that '' Time chartered neutral 
vessels. in respect of which compensation wa.s paid by the 
claiming power might also be included [in computing the 
amount of Germany's reparation payments under para-
graph 9 of Annex I],. though not sailing under the flag 
of the po\ver in question." 
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It follows thn,t the claims for losses resulting from the 
destruction of the steamships llferak and Texel fall \vithin 
Decision, 
the terms of the treaty of Berlin and that Germany is 
obligated to compensate for their loss. 
Case No. 546, steamship John G. lJ!cOullough 
The steamship John G. McCullough, owned by the zo~~ 
United States Steamship Co., an American national, \Vas 
requisitioned by the United States through the Shipping 
Board November 6, 1917, under a bare-boat requisition 
charter. On the same day she \vas delivered she \vas 
turned over to the War Department of the United States 
and operated \vith a British civilian cre\v, 32 in number, 
employed and paid by and in all things subject to the 
orders of the United States War Department. Under 
the requisition charter she thereupon became a public 
ship. 
She was armed \vith one French 90 mm. gun, \vhich 
\Vas manned by a British naval cre\v of t\vo gunners. 
Jf cCul-
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While en route, May 18, 1918, from London, England, 
in naval convoy to Rochefort, France, with a general 
cargo for the Army oj the United States, she was destroyed, 
ci ther by a torpedo from a German submarine, as claimed 
hy the American agent, or by a mine, which may or may 
not have been of German origin. The German agent 
denies that she \Vas torpedoed by a German submarine. 
The German Admiralty is \Vithout information \Vith re-
spect to her destruction. There is, how .. ever, evidence 
supporting the allegation that she \Vas torpedoed; but· 
in view of the disposition \vhich the commission will make 
of this case the cause of her destruction is not material. 
Publicship. At the time the lfcGullough was destroyed she was a 
public ship in the possession of and operated by the 
United States through its vVar Department, one of the 
military arms of the Government whose every effort \vas 
concentrated on mobilizing and hurling men and muni-
tions against Germany. She had been requisitioned in 
European \Vaters. America's associates in the \var had 
assisted in manning and equipping her. France had sup-
plied armament and Great Britain had supplied a naval 
gun crew. She was transporting from England to France 
supplies for the active fighting forces of the Army of the 
United States. She possessed every indicia of a military 
character save that she was not licensed to engage in 
o_fferisive warfare against enemy ships. Offensive opera-
tion on the seas \Vas not her function. The fact that the 
legal title to her had not vested in the United States is 
wholly immaterial. She Vias in the possession of the 
United States. It had the right against all the \Vorld 
to hold, use, and operate her and was in fact operating 
her through its War Department by a master and cre\v 
employed by and subject in every respect to the orders 
of the War Department. She \Vas actively performing 
a service for the Army on the fighting front. She pos-
sessed none of the indicia of a merchant vessel. The 
very requisition charter under \vhich she \Vas operating 
took pains to declare her a "public ship" and not a mer-
chant vessel subject to the la\vs, regulations, and liabili-
ties as such as was the Lake J,fonroe. 37 She \Vas at the 
time of her destruction being utilized for" other * * * 
military purposes" \Vi thin the meaning of that phrase as 
used in section 5 of the shipping act. She \Vas impre:~sed 
\Vith a military character. 
a1 The Lake },fonro e, (1919) 2.')1 U. S . 24J3. 
MILITARY MATERIALS DISTINGUISHED 
The taxicabs privately owned and operated for profit 
in Paris during September, 1914, 'vere in no sense mili-
tary materials; but 'vhen these sam·e taxicabs were requi-
sitioned by the military governor of Paris and used to 
transport French reserves to meet and repel the oncoming 
German Army they became military materials, and so 
remained until redelivered to their owners. The auto-
mobile belonging to the United States assigned to its 
President and constitutional commander in chief of its 
Army for use in Washington is in no sense military 
materials. But had that same automobile been trans-
ported to the battle front in France or Belgium and used 
by the same President, it vvould have become a part of 
the military equipment of the Army and as such im-
pressed \vith a military character. The steel rails used 
in the yards of a steel plant in Pittsburgh for shifting 
war rna terials from one part of the plant to another are 
not impressed vvith a military character, for they are 
privately operated for private profit. But if these same 
rails had been taken up and shipped to the American 
Army in France and laid by it as a part of its transporta-
tion system, used and operated by it for transporting 
munitions and supplies to the fighting front, they 'vould 
then have become military materials. 
So here the Me C~Zlough, by the ter1ns of her requisition Dec·ision. 
charter stamped a "public ship," actively engaged in 
transporting Army supplies to the battle front, operated 
by the War Department of the United States through 
a cre'W employed and paid by it and subject in all things 
to its orders, was at the time of her destruction "military 
materials" and not property for which Germany is obli-
gated to pay under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin. 
Case No. 547, steamship Joseph Cudahy-oil tanker 
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The steamship Joseph Cudahy, an oil tanker, o'vned by The Jo .. ~ e ph 
th A · I 1· C · 1 C · f N Clldahv. e mer1can ta Ian ommerc1a orporat1on, o e'v 
York, an American national, 'vas requisitioned by the 
United States through the Shipping Board on October 
3, 1917, and on the same day delivered to the War De-
partment and operated by the United States Anny 
Transport Service under a bare-boat charter by a civilian 
cre'v employed and paid by and in all things subject 
to the orders of the Army authorities. She 'vas anned 
'vith t'vo 3-inch guns. Her armament 'vas manned by 
a United States naval cre'v of 21 men. She had carried 
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a cargo of gasoline and naphtha for the United States 
Army from Bayonne, N. J., calling first at La Pollice, 
France, and then to Le Verdon, and discharged her 
cargo at Furt, Gironde River. She sailed from LeV erdon 
in ballast on her return trip to New York on August 14, 
1918, in convoy with 28 other vessels. The convoy 
broke up during the night of August 15. She \Vas tor-
pedoed by a German submarine and sunk on the morn-
ing of August 17. 
The fact that she was in ballast at the tilne of her 
destruction is immaterial. Being a tank ship operated 
by and for the exclusive use of the Army Transport 
Service of the United States, her return in ballast for 
additional supplies of gasoline and naphtha for the 
United States Army on the fighting front \Vas an in-
separable part of her military operations. 
For the reasons set out in connection \Vith the destruc-
tion of the John G. McCullough the commission holds 
that the Joseph Cudahy at the time of her destruction 
was impressed with the character of "military materials" 
and that the loss suffered by the United States resulting 
from her destruction is not one for which Germany is 
obligated to pay under the terms of the treaty of Berlin. 
Case No. 548, steamship A. A. Raven 
The Raven, The steamship A. A. Raven, owned by the American 
Transportation Co. (Inc.), an American national, 'vas 
requisitioned by the United States through the Shipping 
Board, and a bare-boat requisition charter \Vas executed 
on February 19, 1918. She was delivered to and oper-
ated by the War Department with a civilian cre'v em-
ployed and paid by and in all respects subject to the 
orders of the War Department. She \Vas armed 'vith 
two 3-inch guns but had no armed guard at the tin1e of 
her loss. vVhile en route in convoy on lVIarch 14, 1918, 
from Barry, England, to Brest, and thence to Bordeaux, 
France, she \Vas sunk. The German Admiralty has 
no record of her having been torpedoed by a Gern1an 
submarine a.s claimed by the .A .. merican agent. As 
pointed out by the German agent, she may possibly 
have struck a mine adrift from fields planted by the 
Netherlands Government along the Dutch coast not 
far froln the point where the A. A. R':JVen \Vas sunk. 
The evidence that she was torpedoed, while far froni 
satisfactory, is sufficient t.o support the allegation. 
RULES FOR HULL LOSSES 
IIowever, in vie'v of the disposition which the commission 
'vill make of this case the cause of her destruction is 
immaterial. . 
At the time of her destruction she had a cargo of 
food, clothing, surgical instruments, hospital supplies, 
piping, and rails and 400 tons of explosives, all belonging 
to the United States and all designed for the use of the 
American Army in France. 
For the reasons set forth in connection 'vith the case Decision. 
involving the loss of the John G. McCullough the com-
mission holds that the steamship A. A. Raven was at the 
time of her destruction in1pressed with a military charac-
ter and t.hat the resultant loss to the United States is 
not one for which Germany is obligated to pay under 
the terms of the treaty of Berlin. 
From the foregoing the colnmission deduces the fol-
lo,ving general rules with respect to the tests to be applied 
in determining when hull losses fall within the excepted 
class of "naval and militarv works or materials" as that 
._/ 
phrase is found in paragraph 9 of Annex I to Section I 
of Part \Till of the treaty of Versailles as carried by 
reference into the treaty of Berlin: 
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I. In order· to bring a ship \Vi thin the excepted class ro?~~1~rr~sse~~Ies 
she must have been operated by the United States at 
the time of her destruction for purposes directly in 
furtherance of a military operation against Germany or 
her allies. 
II. It is immaterial whether the ship was or was not 
o'Yned by the United States; her possession, either actual 
or constructive, and her use by the United States in direct 
furtherance of a military operation against its then enemies 
constitute the controlling test. 
III. So long as a ship is privately operated for private 
profit she can not be impressed 'vith a military character, 
for only the government can lawfully engage in direct 
warlike activities. 
IV. The fact that a ship was either owned or requisi-
tioned by the Shipping Board or the Fleet Corporation 
and operated by one of them, either directly or through 
an agent, does not create even a rebuttable presumption 
that she "'.vas impressed with a military character. 
V. vVhen, ho,vever, a ship, either owned by or requi-
sitioned by the United States during the period of 
belligerency, passed into the possession and under the 
operation of either th~ War Department or the N nvy 
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Department of the United States, thereby becoming a 
public ship, her master, officers, and crew all being em-
ployed and paid by and subject to the orders of the United 
States, it is to be presumed that such possession, control, 
and operation by a military arm of a government focusing 
all of its powers and energies on actively waging 'var, 
were directly in furtherance of a military operation. 
Such control and operation of a ship will be treated by 
the commission as prima .facie, but not conclusive, 
evidence of her military character. 
VI. Neither (a) the arming for defensive purposes of a 
n1erchantman, nor (b) the manning of such armament by 
a naval gun crew, nor (c) her routing by theN avy Depart-
ment of the United States for the purpose of avoiding the 
enemy, nor (d) the follo,ving by the civilian master of 
such merchantman of instructions given by the Navy 
Department for the defense of the ship when attacked 
by or when in danger of attack by the enemy, nor (e) her 
seeking the protection of a convoy and submitting herself 
to naval instructions as to route and operation for the 
purpose of avoiding the enemy, nor all of these combined, 
will suffice to impress such merchantman 'vith a military 
character. 
VII. The facts in each case will be carefully examined 
and weighed and the commission will determine whether 
or not the particular ship at the time of her destruction 
was operated by the United States directly in furtherance 
of a military operation against Germany or her allies. 
If she was so operated she 'vill fall within the excepted 
class, otherwise she will not. 
The preliminary submissions of the 13 cases specifically 
dealt with in this opinion will not be held a waiver of the 
right of either the American agent or the German agent 
to file in any of them additional proofs bearing on the 
points decided. Such additional proofs if filed will be 
considered by the commission on the final submission, 
when the principles and rules herein announced will be 
applied and final decisions rendered. In the absence of 
further evidence, the interlocutory decisions herein 
rendered in each of these 13 cases will become final. 
Done at Washington, March 25, 1924. 
ED\VIN B. pARKER, 
Umpire. 
Concurring in the conclusions: 
W. KIESSELBACH, 
German Commissioner. 
RETURN VOYAGE ~ 1 5. 
I concur in the conclusions generally, but not in the 
conclusions that on the facts stated with reference to the 
Joseph Cudahy she was impressed with the character of 
''military and naval "\vorks or materials" within the 
1neaning of that phrase as used in the provisions of the 
treaty of Versailles under consideration. 
One of the conclusions concurred in ir that the control 
and operation of a vessel by the War Department of the 
United States for Army service, as "\vas the case "\vith the 
Joseph Cudahy, constitutes prima facie but not conclusive 
evidence of her military character. 
Another conclusion concurred in is that in order to 
bring a vessel within the excepted class she must have 
been operated by the United States at the tin1e of her 
destruction "for purposes directly in furtherance of a 
military operation against Germany or her allies." 
On the facts stated, the Joseph Cudahy was returning Return voyage ~ 
home from France to the ·united States in ballast at the 
time of her destruction, so that she was not being operated 
at that time "for purposes directly in furtherance of a 
military operation against Germany or her allies." 
Accordingly the presumption arising from her control 
and operation by the War Department is completely 
rebutted by her actual use and situation at the time of 
her destruction. 
CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, 
American Commissioner. 
